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ABSTRACT 
In light of the recent humongous growth of the human population worldwide, there has also been a 
voluminous and uncontrolled growth of vehicles, which has consequently increased the number of road 
accidents to a large extent. In lieu of a solution to the above mentioned issue, our system is an attempt to 
mitigate the same using synchronous programming language. The aim is to develop a safety crash 
warning system that will address the rear end crashes and also take over the controlling of the vehicle 
when the threat is at a very high level. Adapting according to the environmental conditions is also a 
prominent feature of the system. Safety System provides warnings to drivers to assist in avoiding rear-end 
crashes with other vehicles. Initially the system provides a low level alarm and as the severity of the 
threat increases the level of warnings or alerts also rises. At the highest level of threat, the system enters 
in a Cruise Control Mode, wherein the system controls the speed of the vehicle by controlling the engine 
throttle and if permitted, the brake system of the vehicle. We focus on this crash area as it has a very high 
percentage of the crash-related fatalities. To prove the feasibility, robustness and reliability of the system, 
we have also proved some of the properties of the system using temporal logic along with a reference 
implementation in ESTEREL. To bolster the same, we have formally verified various properties of the 
system along with their proofs. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
With the advent of an era of new technological advances and developments, there has been a 
considerable growth in almost all the facets; being it human population or the industries. In 
accordance with the same, there also has been an abundant and herculean increase in the number 
of vehicles or automobiles on the roads. Consequently, this increase of vehicles has led to a 
alarming growth of the fatal road accidents throughout the globe. Statistics depict that more than 
2.2% of the total deaths recently have occurred because of the road crashes which could have 
been prevented. Also, if the same statistics are at play in future, then the World Health 
Organization by 2020, road fatalities will be the third highest threat to the public health, 
outranking most of the dangerous health problems [20].  
The above discussion, clearly brings into light that, today, the need of the hour is to curb the rate 
of road fatalities. In light of the same, as a solution to the stated issue, we have proposed a 
safety cruise control system which addresses the problem of minimizing the number of vehicle 
crashes due to erroneous controlling of the vehicle, and thereby decreasing the road accidents. 
Safety Cruise Control System for Automobiles with ESTEREL Implementation and Validation 
is our proposal for safety system for automobiles wherein, the automobile will be equipped with 
a Safety System, which will alert the drivers when there is a potential for crash. It consists 
mainly of a safety algorithm and a Cruise Control System. The goal is to reduce the number and 
severity of automobile fatalities and crashes. The system is broadly classified in two sub- 
systems: 
• Safety System 
• Cruise Control System 
These form the two major working units of the system. The architecture of the system is shown 
in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1.  Subsystems of the Architecture 
Figure 1 illustrates the architecture of the system in brief. Initially, the safety system considers 
the environmental conditions in which the vehicle is operating, plus it collects data from the 
ambience of the vehicle, and then checks the current stature of the host vehicle. It then analyses 
the acquired data and then reports to the driver accordingly. The reports to the driver are sent 
through the Driver Vehicle Interface. The driver can also interact with the system via this 
interface. Later, if the safety system discovers a potential of a crash, it then drives the Cruise 
Control system by asking it to come into play and control the operations of the vehicle. In this 
way, since the Cruise control system will have the control of the vehicle in crash-probable 
circumstances, the chances of safeness rise as the crash will be mitigated in the cases, where it is 
possible to shun the crash. The details of the working of each subsystem are presented in the 
subsequent sections. 
In this paper, we propose the safety system along with its implementation in a synchronous 
programming language named ESTEREL. We also prove the robustness and reliability of the 
system by stating and proving certain properties of the system. Initially, we will state some of 
the specifications of the system by making use of temporal logic, and will then justify by formal 
verification that our implementation conforms to the specification stated; thereby warranting the 
pragmatic genre of the system. 
Rest of the paper is organized in the following manner. Section 2.1 discusses the Safety System 
and its intricacies. Section 2.2 introduces the Cruise Control system. Section 2.3 explicates the 
details of the architecture of the system. Section 2.4 provides a snippet of reference 
implementation of the safety system in ESTEREL. Section 2.5 presents the specification in 
temporal logic along with the formal verification of the ESTEREL modules. Section 3 presents 
the conclusions of the paper.  
 
 
 
 
2. THE SYSTEM DESIGN 
This section explicates the details of the system, with throwing special light on drafting the 
specifications and then verifying them for the proposed system.  
2.1. Safety System 
The Safety System forms the heart of the Safety Cruise Control System [19], [13], [12]. It 
consists of a sensor (Section 2.1.1) that gathers data from the vehicle’s ambience. At each 
instance of time, here each instance of time can be mapped to each clock tick, the sensor gets 
the new roadway data and this data is then analysed by the safety algorithm to check it against 
the predefined safety parameters. The concept of pre-defined parameters will be explained in 
next section. If the current host vehicle conditions are such that they are in close physical 
proximity to the threshold limit of the safety parameters, then the system sends an alert to the 
driver that there is a potential for a crash with the lead vehicle or an arbitrary object. Also, if the 
current circumstances are such that there is a high probability of crash or any other accident, the 
safety algorithm instructs the Cruise Control System to take over the controlling of the vehicle. 
Details of Cruise Control System are documented in Section 2.2. 
2.1.1. Sensor Details 
The Safety System mentioned above makes use of a sensor to collect the data of various 
parameters from the vehicle’s environment. Our proposal includes employment of a sensor (off-
the-shelf-component) named Forward Looking Automotive Radar Sensor. This sensor perfectly 
suffices our purpose since it is specially designed to be used in Intelligent Cruise Control 
Systems and Collision Warning Systems. Following paragraph talks about the specifications of 
the sensor.   
A Forward Looking Automotive Radar Sensor: This sensor available from [10] is a specially 
built sensor for intelligent cruise control and forward looking collision warning systems. They 
are used to collect information about traffic and obstacles in the roadway ahead. Few of the 
distinguishing features of this sensor are:  
• It correctly identifies a lead-vehicle being followed, constantly distinguishing between 
lead vehicle and competing vehicles and roadside objects. 
• Report the distance and relative speed of the lead vehicle to platform vehicle speed 
control unit. 
The specifications of the sensor are given in Table 1. 
Table 1.  Sensor Performance Specifications 
Characteristic Value 
Operating Frequency 76-77 GHz (MMW) 
Range 3-10+ meters 
Range Accuracy << 0.5 meters 
Relative Speed +/- 160 Km/h 
Field of View 
(Azimuth) 
9 Degrees 
Interface 
SAE J1850, RS-232, 
High Speed Parallel 
 
The sensor specifically makes use of algorithms to interpret the transmitted and received radar 
signals to determine the distance, relative speed and azimuth angle between host vehicle and the 
vehicle or object ahead of it in the lane. The ESTEREL Module gets this data through interfaces 
and then applies its algorithm on it. 
2.1.2. Safety Algorithm 
The sensor collects the data from the environmental conditions and current ambience of the 
vehicle at each instance of time and forwards it for analysis to the ESTEREL Module. The 
Safety Algorithm then compares the values of the various parameters in the received data with 
the set of predefined parameters. If the received values are close to the threshold limit of that 
particular parameter, then the algorithm emits a signal to the driver through the Driver Vehicle 
Interface, that there is a potential for a crash with the lead vehicle or an object in front of the 
host vehicle in the lane. We first discuss the parameters that are taken into consideration to 
identify the potential threat, the different proposed choices to set the predefined parameters and 
how the data from the sensor is analysed.  
Predefined Parameters: Physical parameters of the vehicle, roadway and other objects are taken 
into account which assists us in identification of potential for a crash or any other threat. The 
parameters are: distance, relative speed and azimuth. Distance is the distance between the host 
vehicle and the lead vehicle or an object in the lane. Relative Speed is the speed of the lead 
vehicle with respect to the host vehicle. Azimuth field-of-view of the camera is the span of the 
angle between two boarders that falls in the sensitivity of the installed sensor device. All these 
parameters are illustrated in the Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2.  Parameters under consideration for front crashes 
The threshold values of these parameters are set in the safety algorithm. We term these 
parameters as Predefined Parameters. They are altered as per the choices mentioned in next 
paragraph. 
Choices to set the Predefined Parameters: We propose three different choices to the user/driver 
for setting the values of the predefined parameters mentioned in the previous paragraph, viz. 
1) The manufacturer can fabricate the default values of these parameters. 
2) Driver can customize these values as per his driving habits. 
3) The system can automatically learn its environmental conditions and set the parameters 
accordingly. 
Initially, when the system is being configured the manufacturer can set the threshold values of 
the parameters. These values could be set with certain generic conditions in mind. For example, 
the overall condition of the roads in the country, overall traffic statistics, etc. The user has an 
option of retaining these values or customizing them according to his driving habits and 
convenience. Also, these values can be adapted according to the environmental conditions in 
which the vehicle is running. For instance, if it is raining, the values can be adjusted accordingly 
so that the system gives an alert at a considerable safe distance from the remote object, or if the 
vehicle is travelling on a road which has dense fog, the values need to be altered in such a way 
that they suit the current environment of the vehicle and the alert is at such a distance that the 
vehicle can be controlled safely to shun the crash. For monitoring the environmental conditions, 
micro-condensed sensors or sensors that can judge their ambience can be used. We assume that 
this data is also sent to our ESTEREL Module which takes into account the climatic conditions 
of the vehicle.  
Data from the Sensor: The sensor collects real-time parameters from the vehicle’s ambience. 
The parameters that are taken into consideration are: distance, relative speed and azimuth. The 
definitions of these parameters are the same as explained above. These parameters are sent to 
the safety algorithm by means of an interface, and then the algorithm uses them for further 
analysis. 
 
2.2. Cruise Control System 
Cruise Control System [15], [18] forms the second subsystem of Safety Cruise Control for 
Automobiles. As mentioned in the previous section, the safety algorithm sends appropriate 
notifications to the driver whenever there is a potential for a crash or any other threat. However, 
if the vehicle is in close physical proximity to the lead vehicle or any object, it might be the case 
that the driver reaction time is not so fast that it can preempt the crash. In such cases, the 
algorithm sends a signal of a high level threat and instructs the Cruise Control Subsystem to 
take over the control of the vehicle and reduce the speed by controlling the engine throttle and if 
permissible the brake system of the vehicle, thereby making the best possible attempt to pre-
empt the crash and avoid any further injuries or fatalities. An appropriate alert is sent to the 
driver through the Driver Vehicle Interface; so that the driver can also keep a track of the fact, 
that the Cruise control system in his vehicle is playing the role of the avoiding the crash.  
2.3. Architecture 
 
Figure 3.  Detailed Architecture of the System 
The previous sections described about the two subsystems of ESTEREL Implementation and 
Validation of Cruise Controller. This section highlights the architecture of the entire system. As 
shown in the Figure 2, the input to the system will be from the Automotive Radar Sensor. The 
sensor makes use of algorithms to interpret the transmitted and received radar signals to 
determine the distance, relative speed and azimuth between host vehicle and the vehicle or 
object ahead of it in the lane. These parameters are used as an input to the safety algorithm. The 
algorithm in turn compares these currently available values with a set of threshold values to 
check if there is a potential for a crash and notifies the driver accordingly to take appropriate 
actions. If the level of threat is high, then the system enters in Cruise Control Mode and takes 
over the control of the system to mitigate the threat.  
Figure 3 shows a detailed architecture of the system. The current environmental conditions and 
the data from the vehicle’s ambience like relative distance, speed and azimuth angle are taken as 
input to the sensor. The sensor, then passes the current values to the safety system. These 
current values are compared with the set of the pre-defined values of those respective 
parameters. The predefined parameters can be overwritten by the values from the Environment 
Monitor. If the current values of the parameters are less than the threshold limit, then the vehicle 
is in safe state and can proceed safely. But the moment the values surpass the threshold limit, an 
alert is raised. Now, depending on the threat severity, the system chooses its mode of operation. 
If the level of threat is low, then an appropriate notification or alert is sent to the driver and if 
the level is high, the system enters the Cruise Control Mode to take over the controlling of the 
vehicle.  
Driver Vehicle Interface: The Driver Vehicle Interface (DVI) will be the means by which the 
driver can get the visual warnings. We define different levels of alarms based upon the severity 
of the threat. As the sensor can identify objects with their distance, if the object is far enough, 
then a minimal warning can be issued, and as the distance between the host vehicle and lead 
vehicle reduces, the level of warnings can be intensified. Audio warnings depending on the 
threat severity can be employed, i.e. different tones of varying length for different threat levels. 
These tones can also be customizable by the driver. This interface will also provide means from 
which the driver can access the feedback given to him by the system like the notifications and 
alerts sent while his is driving the vehicle. 
2.4. ESTEREL Module 
2.4.1. ESTEREL 
Many real time applications demand reactive systems. Reactive systems are the ones which 
continuously react to their input signals and optionally produce output signals which are used by 
other systems. Such systems need to have support for Control Handling. Control Handling deals 
with producing discrete output signals for the input signals. ESTEREL [17], [3], [8], [4] is a 
synchronous and imperative concurrent programming language that is used for programming 
reactive systems. It also provides a compiler that translates ESTEREL programs into their 
associated finite-state machines. It provides support for sensors and signals that can be easily 
received and emitted by the modules. It is easily employed in applications, which need 
communication of data in its subsystems. This communication is achieved by means of 
broadcasting of signals. Various modules of a system use these broadcasted signals for sharing 
the data available with them.  
We chose ESTEREL for our implementation purposes because; our system needs synchronous 
communication of various parameters from the vehicle’s ambience (collected by the sensor) and 
the predefined parameters to the safety algorithm. This can be easily achieved by building 
different modules for different subsystems which work in perfect synchrony. The subsystems 
can send signals to each other and can work in parallel. Also, the alerts need to be sent to the 
driver through the Driver Vehicle Interface. These alerts can be sent by emitting signals from 
the appropriate modules. ESTEREL being an imperative concurrent programming language 
allows synchronous communication between the modules, which perfectly models the real time 
behaviour of the system and also simplifies the embedding of these modules in related hardware 
circuitry. Section II-D2 presents snippets of the various modules for building our system. A 
formal verification of some of the modules is also presented in Section II-E.  
2.4.2. ESTEREL Implementation of Proposed System 
The language constructs and coding conventions can be found in [1], [2]. Following are the 
snippets of ESTEREL Codes for implementation of our system. In this reference 
implementation we do not consider the parameter named azimuth field of view. Separate 
modules are built for the different subsystems shown in Figure 1. These modules communicate 
with each other by broadcasting the signals. 
module SAFETY_SYSTEM : 
Run SET_PREDEFINED_VALUES; 
Run ROAD_DATA; 
|| 
Run HOST_VEHICLE; 
|| 
Run DRIVER_ALARM; 
end module 
This module forms the main algorithm which invokes other modules and runs them in parallel. 
In the first step it runs the SET_PREDEFINED_VALUES module which is used to set the 
predefined values of the various parameters. Further, it invokes the modules ROAD_DATA, 
HOST_VEHICLE and DRIVER_ALARM and runs them in parallel throughout the life of the 
program. 
 
module SET_PREDEFINED_VALUES : 
var distance := 12 : integer; 
% While Fabrication 
var speed := 20 : integer; 
output PreDefinedDistance : integer; 
output PreDefinedSpeed : integer; 
Run ENVIRONMENT_CHECK; 
|| 
present 
case rain do 
distance := 10; 
speed := 18; 
case mist do 
distance := 8; 
speed := 17; 
case normal do 
distance := 5; 
speed := 20; 
Run DRIVERINPUT ; 
|| 
await InputDistance; 
|| 
await InputSpeed; 
if distance < ?InputDistance then 
distance := ?InputDistance; 
emit PreDefinedDistance(distance); 
end if 
if speed < ?InputSpeed then 
speed := ?InputSpeed; 
emit PreDefinedSpeed(speed); 
end if 
end module 
 
This module, called by SAFETY_SYSTEM, sets the values of the predefined parameters (The 
values of predefined parameters used in these modules are specimens only. They may differ in 
practical implementations). The manufacturer can set the values whilst fabrication or these 
values can be user-driven and environment adaptive. The module, first calls module 
ENVIRONMENT_CHECK which returns the climatic condition of the vehicle’s ambience. 
Based on these conditions the values of parameters are set. These values are then compared with 
those obtained from the driver. Finally the safest values are assigned to the parameters. 
 
module ENVIRONMENT_CHECK : 
sensor climate; 
% Get Data from the sensor and 
% output the climatic condition 
end module 
 
The environmental conditions in which the vehicle is running are analysed by this module. We 
assume that the sensors used for building this module are capable of sensing the ambient 
conditions. It returns the appropriate climatic condition to module 
SET_PREDEFINED_VALUES. 
 
module DRIVERINPUT : 
output InputDistance : integer; 
output InputSpeed : integer; 
var distance := ?enteredDistance; 
emit InputDistance(distance); 
var speed := ?enteredSpeed; 
emit InputSpeed(speed); 
end module 
 
This module accepts the values of parameters from the driver through the Driver Vehicle 
Interface and passes these values to the SET_PREDEFINED_VALUES module. This completes 
the steps required for initiating the system. Now, the system starts running by executing 
ROAD_DATA, HOST_VEHICLE and DRIVER_ALARM in parallel. These continue to run till 
the vehicle’s engine is turned off. 
 
module ROADDATA: 
input distance, speed, SAMPLE_FREQ, 
STOP_VEHICLE, 
RUNNING; 
output DistanceSignal, SpeedSignal; 
weak abort 
every immediate SAMPLE_FREQ do 
present RUNNING then 
loop 
present [distance and speed] then 
emit DistanceSignal 
|| 
emit SpeedSignal; 
end present; 
pause; 
end loop; 
end present; 
end every; 
when STOP_VEHICLE; 
end module 
 
ROAD_DATA module fetches the data from the sensor and makes it available for other 
modules. The samples of the data are collected with the sampling rate determined by 
SAMPLE_FREQ. As the number of revolutions of the wheel increase, the sampling rate 
increases accordingly. 
 
module DRIVER_ALARM: 
output Alert; 
var criticalDistance := 4 : integer; 
var criticalSignal := 10 : integer; 
await DistanceSignal; 
|| 
await PreDefinedDistance; 
|| 
await SpeedSignal; 
|| 
await PreDefinedSpeed; 
if ?DistanceSignal <= ?PreDefinedDistance or 
?SpeedSignal <= ?PreDefinedSpeed then 
if ?DistanceSignal <= criticalDistance 
or 
?SpeedSignal <= criticalSpeed then 
% Enter Cruise Control Mode; 
emit Alert(1); 
else 
% Raise Lower Level Alarm 
emit Alert(0); 
end if 
end if 
end module 
 
DRIVER_ALARM module sends an alert to the driver about the threats. It gets the roadway 
data and the values of the predefined parameters. If the values of parameters from the roadway 
data drop below a threshold value(criticalDistace and criticalSpeed), then a lower level alert is 
sent to the driver and if the values drop below a certain critical value then the module sends a 
higher level alert to the driver. Alert(1) signifies that there is a high level threat, Alert(0) 
signifies a lower level threat. 
 
module HOST_VEHICLE: 
input LowAlert, CruiseControlAlert; 
output LowNotification, CruiseControlMode; 
present 
case LowAlert do 
emit LowNotification; 
case CruiseControlAlert do 
run Cruise; 
end present; 
end module 
 
module CRUISE: 
output CruiseControlMode; 
emit CruiseControlMode; 
end module 
 
This module sends notification to the driver through the Driver Vehicle Interface when there is a 
lower level threat and if a higher level threat is detected it calls the CRUISE module which 
emits the signal for the Cruise Control mode and takes over the control of the system. 
 
module CRUISE_CONTROL: 
input SAMPLE_FREQ, CruiseControlMode; 
output ControlEngine, ControlBrake, 
NotifyDriver; 
every immediate SAMPLE_FREQ do 
present CruiseControlMode then 
emit ControlEngine 
|| 
emit ControlBrake 
|| 
emit NotifyDriver; 
end present ; 
end every; 
end module 
 
The CRUISE_CONTROL module handles the Cruise Control Mode of the system. Whenever 
the vehicle enters in a critical threat region, this mode is activated. It sends appropriate control 
signals to the hardware circuitry in the vehicle to control the engine throttle and the brake 
system. ControlEngine, ControlBrake and NotifyDriver signals are further used by the vehicle’s 
control circuitry for actionable control of the vehicle. 
 
2.5. Formal Verification of ESTEREL Modules 
This section presents the formal verification [16], [5] of the Esterel Modules presented above. 
We verify by using FSM minimization and checking the status of outputs and verifying the 
properties [5]. We employ a formal verification of this system which allows us to test the 
conformance of the design with specification. For verification, we will use Xeve Verification 
environment from the ESTEREL toolset [7], [9] to verify the formal correctness of the Esterel 
modules presented in the previous sections. The method of model checking is to represent the 
design as a reduced finite automata by FC2TOOLS [6], [11] using the concept of bisimulation 
[14]. The states are shown by circles, inputs by “?” and outputs by “!”. Fig. 4 shows the reduced 
automata for the RoadData module.  
 
Checking output signals and verifying properties: Initially we specify the properties in terms 
and notations of temporal logic [21], [22] and then provide its explanation. Theoretical details 
of checking output signals and verifying their properties are available at [5]. Fig. 5 shows the 
snapshot of Xeve verifying the RoadData module. Consider the following property:  
p1: RunningState → ◊ValuesBroadcasted 
When the vehicle is in RUNNING state, then for each SAMPLE_FREQ the distance and speed 
are taken as inputs and their values are broadcasted to other modules. 
Notice that p1 claims that when the vehicle is on and is in running state then for each sampling 
frequency SAMPLE_FREQ, it shall get the current values of distance and speed and broadcast 
them to the other modules. As shown in Fig. 5, we can verify p1 by setting RUNNING and 
SAMPLE_FREQ as “always present” (marked as red in left window), while setting the STOP 
VEHICLE to “always absent”. DistanceSignal and SpeedSignal are set to red which means they 
are to be checked if they are “possibly emitted”. On clicking “Apply”, Xeve shows that 
DistanceSignal and SpeedSignal are Always Emitted, and by this we can conclude that the 
current values of distance and speed are broadcasted. Similarly consider property 
p2: VehicleStop → □¬(EmitSignal) 
When the vehicle stops, the system should stop emitting signals and halt. 
 
Figure 4.  Reduced Finite Automata of module RoadData obtained from FC2TOOLS 
Fig. 6 verifies this property, wherein, now we set STOP VEHICLE as “Always present” and 
RUNNING as “Always absent”. If this condition occurs, then we say that the vehicle has 
stopped running and is halted. Consequently, (as shown in right window of Fig. 6) the 
DistanceSignal and SpeedSignal are also not emitted and the system halts which also verifies 
p2. 
 
Figure 5.  Snapshot of Xeve Verification for RoadData module when vehicle is running 
 
 Figure 6.  Snapshot of Xeve Verification for RoadData module when vehicle is Stopped 
We now consider the HostVehicle module for verification. The vital property that needs to be 
verified in this module is that, 
p3: PotentialForCrash → □ (CruiseControlMode) 
Whenever the vehicle goes in a close physical proximity to the lead vehicle or object, the system 
enters the Cruise Control Mode. 
This property claims that whenever the vehicle’s speed and distance cross the threshold values 
of alert as set by the system, or in other words, is in close physical proximity to the lead vehicle 
or the object, the safety system should take over the control of the system and enter the Cruise 
Control Mode. Fig. 7 shows snapshot of verification of this property, in which we set the 
CruiseControlAlert Signal to be “Always present”, which in turn says (as shown in right 
window of Fig. 7) that CruiseControlMode Signal is emitted and the system will enter the 
appropriate mode, thereby avoiding the immediate crash with the lead vehicle or object. Fig. 8 
also shows that, when the system is to enter in the Cruise Control Mode, a LowLevelAlert is 
never emitted, which consequently verifies that the system works ideally in cases of where there 
is an immediate probability for crash. 
 
Figure 7.  Snapshot of Xeve Verification for HostVehicle module with presence of 
CruiseControlAlert Signal 
  
Figure 8.  Snapshot of Xeve Verification for HostVehicle module showing the status of 
LowNotification Output Signal  
p4: CruiseControlMode  → □ (ControlEngineCircuitry ˄ NotifyDriver) 
When in Cruise Control Mode, the system takes over the control of the brake and engine 
circuitry and notifies the driver about the same 
The above property p4 says that, whenever the system works in Cruise Control mode, it takes 
over the brake circuitry of the vehicle and controls the engine throttle to lower the pace of the 
vehicle and mitigate the probable crash with the lead vehicle or object. Also, the driver needs to  
be informed about the same through the DVI panel. Fig. 9 illustrates the snapshot of 
CruiseControl module in Xeve verification, wherein, we have set the SAMPLE_FREQ and 
CruiseControlMode signals to be “Always present”and one of the output signal (NotifyDriver) 
to be checked if it is “possibly not emitted”, while setting other output signals to be checked if 
they are “possibly emitted”. We observe that, no matter the check of whether the signals are 
possibly emitted or not, our module Always Emits the ControlBrake, ControlEngine and 
NotifyDriver signals, from which we can conclude that the system behaves as intended in the 
Cruise Control Mode also.  
The above formal specification supports the formal reasoning, which, because it can be checked 
by machine can be made very reliable indeed. Formal Verification thus guarantees the 
robustness and reliability of our reactive system, since it is possible to calculate the truth or 
falsehood of the specification by simply checking the status of output signals or traversing along 
the states of the finite automata, thereby proving the logical correctness of the system. Because 
of these distinguishing characteristics, its simulation on hardware is also simplified, which also 
assists in the reduction of development time and efforts. 
 Figure 9.  Snapshot of Xeve Verification for CruiseControl module showing ALWAYS 
EMITTED status for NotifyDriver Output Signal  
Our Platform for Verification: For verification purposes, we have used ESTEREL and Xeve[7], 
[9], [6], [11] on GNU/Linux Ubuntu 10.04 Lucid Lynx running on Dell Studio 1531 with 
Intel(R) Core(TM)2 Duo CPU T6400 @ 2.00GHz speed having Cache size 2048 KB and two 
CPU cores. 
 
3. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper we have proposed a reactive system based implementation of Cruise Controller 
using Synchronous programming language. The Safety System and the Cruise Control system 
help in mitigating the crashes of the host vehicle with other vehicles and objects. The system 
adapts according to the environmental conditions thereby increasing the safeness of the vehicle 
in almost all climatic conditions. The implementation responds faster as ESTEREL logically 
takes no time as compared to other existing systems and lucidly suits the hardware 
implementation. A formal verification of the system along with verification of different 
properties is also done to assure the correctness of the system and ensure the robustness and 
reliability of the system. Encapsulating, the system will assist to improve the safeness of 
vehicles and shall reduce the vehicle crashes on roads. 
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